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Abstract：This paper explores the collaborative mechanism that motivates supply chain firms to collectively 
invest in environmental technology and produce environmental friendly products (EFPs) to reduce pollutant 
emissions and negative impacts on environment and public health. Our paper investigates how such firms can 
achieve the balance between economic feasibility and environmental and social sustainability under multiple 
sustainable constraints in terms of the triple bottom line dimensions. The work also describes the impacts of 
interrelated multiple sustainable constraints on optimal policy for the supply chain transfer price and profit 
allotment decisions. Our findings suggest that government intervention plays a dominant role in governing the 
supply chain firms’ behaviors in the context of environmental and public health sustainability. The profit 
allotment is determined through the process of negotiation of the transfer price interrelated with the government 
subsidy sharing between the supply chain firms.  
Keywords: Supply chain management; Sustainable constraints; Public health; Transfer price; Profit allotment. 
1. Introduction  
Sustainable supply chain management (SSCM) has attracted increasing attention from both academics 
and practitioners. The focal issue has been how to identify optimal solutions that balance environmental, 
social, and economic benefits (Quariguasi et al., 2009). Sustainable supply chains are viewed as 
encompassing components of this triple bottom line, for which supply chain firms need to be engaged in 
the process (Elkington, 1997). Sustainable development related to environmental, social, and economic 
issues advocates firms to improve environmental practices and social responsibilities across their supply 
chains. A balance among the three pillars of the triple bottom line (economics, environment, and society) 
requires a good understanding as to how industrial activities affect the current and future environment 
(Hutchins et al., 2008). Thus, by taking stakeholders’ environmental and social interests as sustainable 
constraints, the purpose of the research at hand is to investigate the mechanism of balance between 
financial feasibility and environmental protection and public health in the context of the supply chain, and 
to gain insight into collaborative transfer price decision and profit allotment between supply chain firms. 
The existing literature has not yet given enough attention to the interactive effects between 
environmental and social externalities, government policies, and stakeholders’ environmental and public 
health interests. The environmental behavior of partner firms may have influences on the supply chain’s 
value transformation process (Klassen and Vachon, 2003). It is likely for those supply chain members with 
higher levels of social performance to seek to strengthen their partnership with influencing stakeholders. 
From the perspective of triple bottom line dimensions, some questions can be raised: which trade-offs 
occur between the environmental, public health, and economic impacts of supply chain firms’ activities? 
How do the sustainable constraints that represent stakeholders’ environmental and public health interests 
affect supply chain firms’ decision behaviors? How can the government subsidy sharing interrelated with 
the transfer price decision and profit allotment be effectively used to motivate supply chain firms’ 
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collaborative investment in green technology? What are the best solutions that balance ecological, social 
(public health), and economic concerns?  
More recently, Ding et al. (2016) developed an environmentally sustainable supply chain model in 
which stakeholders’ interests (environmental carrying capacity, government policies, and customer 
environmental concerns) are considered as multiple environment constraints, and the operations strategy 
decision and economic performance of an integrated environmentally sustainable supply chain for 
producing environmental friendly products (EFPs) is analyzed. However, while considering the firms’ 
environmental behaviors the collaborative mechanism between the supply chain firms in terms of the 
transfer price decision and profit allotment has not yet been investigated. With government intervention, 
the profit allotment, including government policy incentive (subsidy) sharing between the sustainable 
supply chain partners, is a key issue that requires further study.  
Built upon the latest research and taking the view of triple bottom line, this study extends the research 
by including social aspect as a new dimension and examines the externality of environmental pollution, 
namely, the negative impact of environmental pollution on healthcare costs by introducing public health as 
a new constraint to accommodate the social aspect. Our work investigates the optimal policy for 
collaborative supply chain profit allotment subject to sustainable constraints in view of the triple bottom 
line dimensions. In particular, our paper seeks to fill the literature gaps concerning the interplay effects of 
incorporating the triple-dimension sustainable constraints interrelated to the supply chain transfer price and 
profit allotment decisions. From the perspective of a sustainable supply chain, we introduce government 
intervention, including both subsidy and penalty, as an effective driver that motivates supply chain firms to 
collaboratively make their commitment towards pollution prevention and public health assurance via EFPs 
production. Our model reflects stakeholders’ interests from both environmental and public health (social 
aspect interrelated to environmental pollution) perspectives; analyzes the joint effects of multiple 
sustainable constraints and their interplay relations on supply chain transfer price and profit allotment 
decisions; and explicates the environmental, public health, and economic performances of the collaborative 
supply chain. A key issue worthy of exploration for the success of sustainable supply chain collaboration is 
to determine the transfer price interrelated with sharing of government policy incentives between supply 
chain firms, which is more challenging since it involves the allocation of government policy incentives 
between the supply chain firms as well as compliance with sustainable constraints. Therefore, our main 
contribution to the field is the development of an analytical framework for characterizing a sustainable 
supply chain by encompassing transfer pricing, supply chain collaboration, public intervention, and triple-
dimension sustainable constraints. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature. Section 3 
formulates a collaborative sustainable supply chain model with sustainable constraints in the triple bottom 
line dimensions. Section 4 develops a solution structure to sustainable supply chain collaborative 
mechanism on profit allotment through model analysis. Section 5 provides the numerical results and 
discussion. Section 6 presents the supply chain model with two suppliers, assuming that they are not 
competitors to one another. The final section draws conclusions and ends with further research directions. 
2. Literature Review 
SSCM has received increased attention from academics, policy-makers, and practitioners in the past 
decades (Reed, 2008; Bai and Sarkis, 2010; Gold et al., 2010; Ilgin and Gupta, 2010; Barker and Zabinsky, 
2011; Dekker, et al. 2012; Mallidis et al., 2012; Seuring, 2013; Brandenburg et al., 2014; Devika et al., 
2014; Kumar et al., 2014; Fahimnia et al., 2015). With an increasing awareness of and the need for 
environmental protection, firms are compelled by pressure from the stakeholders to incorporate “green” 
practices into their SSCM (Gold et al., 2010). Firms can improve not only their economic benefits but also 
the environmental and social impacts through their internal production processes (Gimenez et al., 2012).  
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Stakeholders’ environmental interests and green technology investment 
The school advocating stakeholders’ environmental and social interests argues that firms should take the 
liability to reduce environmental externalities via green technology investments (Chiu and Yong, 2004; 
Ding et al., 2014; Matthews and Lave, 2000; Holmgren and Amiri, 2007; Longa, et al. 2008). The supply 
chain firms are under the pressure from environmental stakeholders such as consumers, societies, and 
governments for producing environmental friendly products and services. While complying with 
government regulations in relation to the socio-environmental impacts of the supply chain, the firms need 
to achieve consumer satisfaction for green preference and social wellbeing (Gopalakrishnan et al., 2012). 
With their green preference the consumers have a tendency to pay a price premium when they prefer 
environmentally friendly products (Loureiro and Lotade, 2005). The pressure affects the firms’ technology 
adoptions to become environmentally friendly (Luken and Rompaey, 2008).  
Yalabik and Fairchild (2011) examined the impact of pressures from the stakeholders on firms’ green 
technology investment in order to achieve environmental friendly production. They argued that the 
government subsidies are more effective than environmental fines in encouraging firms to invest in 
environmental innovation, especially in those “dirty” industries. Their findings suggest that the incentive 
policy is a stronger driving force for firms’ environmental innovation than the penalty policy. Employed a 
lifecycle approach, Ding et al. (2014) focused on the impact of government policies on the environmental 
friendly product (EFP) projects’ performance and their commercial feasibility. Based on their findings, they 
drew policy implications on how to motivate firms reducing their pollution externalities by producing EFPs. 
Kumar et al. (2014) proposed an environment friendly approach using green data envelopment analysis for 
supplier selection. The approach took regional emission standards into account to encourage suppliers 
going “green” by cutting their carbon footprints. Using a strategic decision-making model, Tseng and Hung 
(2014) considered both operational and social costs incurred by carbon emissions in the context of a supply 
chain network. They suggested that government legislation is an effective way to force firms bearing the 
social costs of their carbon dioxide emissions and improving their environmental and social performances. 
Barari et al. (2012) studied a synergetic alliance concerning environmental and economic trade-offs with 
the maximization of business profits by leveraging the product’s “greenness.” They argued that 
coordination between supply chain firms helps with initiating and adapting their green strategies and 
practices. 
Environmental sustainability and supply chain perspective 
Though scholars have paid much attention on corporate governance’s impact on promoting 
sustainability, there is limited research on the issue in this regard from a supply chain perspective 
(Vermeulen and Seuring, 2009; Alvarez et al., 2010). Employing case study method, Formentini and 
Taticchi (2015) investigated governance mechanisms that are associated with supply chains and 
sustainability. They considered contingency factors from strategic alignment perspective with resource-
based view. Ding et al. (2015) studied business performance of supply chain firms by considering 
environmental externality and government regulation impact in their model. They investigated optimal 
operations strategy of environmental friendly product in the supply chain context. However, it still remains 
unclear how corporate sustainability approaches are implemented and aligned with governance mechanisms 
at the supply chain level (Formentini and Taticchi, 2015). Therefore, there is a need for a better 
understanding as to how the corporate governance can motivate supply chain collaboration considering 
both sustainability and economic trade-offs. 
A firm can gain the maximum benefit only when its sustainable operational strategies are aligned with 
those of its suppliers and customers (Tang and Zhou, 2012). The internalization of environmental 
externalities relies on each firm and the interactive cooperation between the firms within the supply chain 
network. In the context of supply chain management, an important issue is to identify a contract mechanism 
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that benefits to all supply chain members with coordinate profits, so that the members are willing to 
participate in the coordination and optimization. As the supply chain members have different costs and 
revenue structures, they will have different gains and benefits from the collaboration (Simatupang and 
Sridharan, 2005). With respect to profit allotment among the supply chain firms, there have been a growing 
number of studies in the arena. Research on profit sharing among the supply chain members has emerged to 
address the decisions regarding optimal pricing, optimal margin, order and production quantities, and the 
number of shipments, that will maximize the total profit of the whole supply chain (Batarfi et al. 2016). 
Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2004), Cachon and Lariviere (2005) proposed revenue-sharing contracts 
under which suppliers sell their products to distributors at a low wholesale price and they share supply 
chain sales revenue. The proposed revenue-sharing contracts maximize the performance of the whole 
supply chain, and the benefits of each party are adjusted by the distribution coefficient of the neighboring 
nodes. The distribution coefficient is to provide a reasonable profit allotment between supply chain 
members to ensure the supply chain coordination, and also encourage the members to carry out 
technological innovation and operational risks sharing. However, the determination of the distribution 
coefficient between suppliers and distributors has not yet been explored.  
Chauhan and Proth (2005) presented a provider–retailer partnership model that not only maximizes the 
total combined profit but also optimizes the shared profit to each partner proportional to their risk and 
investment. Lakhal (2006) proposed a mathematical model for profit sharing and transfer pricing between 
network firms, enabling maximization of operating profits via the manufacturing-network within its supply 
chain. The study considered the factors including multiple suppliers and retailers, costs differentia, 
resources availability and sharing, and competition with subcontracting option. The model that the study 
employed calculates transfer price of the manufacturing product, based on each firm’s contribution, for the 
way of sharing operating profits between the firms in the supply chain network. Wei and Choi (2010) 
explored the wholesale pricing and profit sharing scheme for coordinating supply chains under the mean–
variance decision framework. The study showed that a unique equilibrium solution to the leader–follower 
Stackelberg game will exist, if the demand satisfies the increasing generalized failure rate, in the 
decentralized setting with a pre-negotiated and determined profit sharing ratio. The manufacturer acts as the 
leader who offers the contract while the retailer is the follower who reacts to the offer. Ding et al. (2011) 
developed a graphic model with three-dimensions to depict the possible cooperative solutions of profit 
allotment between partners in the context of three-echelon supply chain. They applied a game approach and 
analyzed how the profit allotment can effectively motivate partners for collaboration with each other. Feng 
et al. (2014) studied a revenue-sharing contract in an N-stage supply chain using a two-round profit 
allocation mechanism. They argued that it is a flexible method for adjusting the profits in the second round 
by considering the reliability of all of the members. Saha et al. (2015) developed multi-item multi-objective 
manufacturer–retailer supply chain models, considering risk and budget constraints for long-term contracts. 
They also considered a profit sharing scheme in a fuzzy-stochastic environment, at which the 
manufacturing costs of the items are fuzzy, and the demands for the items are random during each of 
periods. Arani et al. (2016) modelled a mixed revenue-sharing option contract. Using a game theoretic 
approach, they examined several possible situations to obtain the retailer’s order quantity and the 
manufacturer’s production quantity in the Nash equilibrium. Becker-Peth and Thonemann (2016) extended 
the classical normative decision model by integrating reference-dependent valuation. They showed how 
behavioral aspects of revenue-sharing affect inventory decisions. Cruz et al. (2008, 2009) investigated the 
interplay between the heterogeneous decision-makers and the equilibrium pattern of product outputs, 
transaction pricing, and levels of social responsibility activities. They considered the multi-criteria 
decision-making approach that includes the maximization of net return and the minimization of emissions 
and risks. However, these studies failed to take environmental or social performances into account.  
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 Ageron et al. (2012) developed a theoretical SSCM framework. They identified the enabling conditions 
and critical success factors, such as performance criteria, greening supply chains, characteristics of 
suppliers, managerial approaches, barriers, benefits, and motivations. Silvestre (2015) explored how supply 
chain sustainability can be implemented and managed in developing countries, especially in the emerging 
economies like BRICs. They pointed out that developing economies face more barriers for SSCM due to 
the complexity and uncertainty of business environment and institutional voids. However, these studies 
neglect the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on firms’ decision-making process in reducing 
environmental pollution. When taking environmental and social impact into consideration, supply chain 
firms’ business behavior will be affected owing to the additional costs for pollution abatement, which 
further affect the profit sharing scheme between supply chain firms.  
 CRS behavior and public health 
 CSR refers to a firm’s business practices involving self-regulations that benefit society for a greener 
business operation (Andersen et al., 2009). Combining case study and survey approaches, Carter and 
Jennings (2002) established a relationship between CSR and supply chain. Hsueh (2008) developed 
mathematical models to investigate firms’ CSR behaviors and their profits in decentralized and centralized 
supply chain networks. CSR ensures firms with a responsible business venture to reduce negative 
environmental footprints and potential health and safety risks, and to gain acceptance from local societies 
(Wirth et al., 2016). The environmental problems such as high level air pollution not only result in health 
risks, but also incur real costs on the citizens, the societies, and the economy as a whole (Matus et al. 2012). 
Norris (2006) examined the relationship between gross national product (GNP) per capita and 
environmental pollution, and the impact of increasing or decreasing in GNP per capita on public health. 
Public health impact assessment identifies any negative health impacts, based on which the government 
policies are to be set accordingly to protect public health (Mittelmark, 2001). It becomes possible to 
analyze the cost effectiveness of pollution abatement strategies and to set air quality standards by 
quantifying the impact of air pollution on public health (Aunan and Pan, 2004). Using different approaches 
such time-series, cross-sectional, panel, case-crossover, cohort, and intervention designs, a number of 
epidemiological studies on air pollution and public health in China have been conducted (Kan et al., 2012; 
Aunan and Pan, 2004; Wang and Mauzerall, 2006). The increased health risks observed among Chinese 
population are much higher than that in developed countries (Kan et al., 2012). Aunan and Pan (2004) 
proposed exposure-response functions to detect the impact of PM10 and SO2 pollution on public health in 
China. Using an integrated assessment approach combining engineering, epidemiology, and economics, 
Wang and Mauzerall (2006) developed air quality and meteorological models to establish the link between 
energy consumption, technologies, air pollution concentrations, and their impacts on public health in the 
Eastern China. Most of these studies have focused on negative public health impact of air pollution using 
either damage function approach or point estimate. However, there has been little attention to be paid for 
reflecting how supply chain firms commit themselves to reduce public health loss.  
 A limited SSCM studies have considered multiple sustainable constraints from the triple bottom line 
dimensions, and the research on how stakeholders’ environmental and social interests can be balanced with 
green investments’ financial feasibility in the supply chain remains rear. In addition, the issues concerning 
how to effectively enable supply chain firms to go for green investments have not yet investigated 
sufficiently. It is still a key issue requiring a further investigation as to how the mechanism for supply chain 
profit sharing would change if the environmental and public health are included into consideration. A 
further study is essential, from eco-efficiency perspective by integrating organizational interdependencies, 
to focus on balancing supply chain firms’ business profits and social interests in the environment protection 
and public health. The present study seeks to fill the literature gaps, using a supply chain model that 
incorporates multiple sustainable constraints to represent stakeholders’ interests from perspective of the 
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triple bottom line including environment and public health. In order to assess green investment 
performance of a supply chain, our model considers not only the environment constraint, but the joint 
impact of other factors including government policies, public healthcare cost, and consumers’ 
environmental awareness. In particular, comparing with previous study (for example, Ding et al., 2014, 
2015, 2016), the contributions of this study lie in two areas by: (1) introducing public health factor to 
represent social interests; (2) exploring the joint impact of environmental and social responsibility 
constraints on supply chain coordination for profit sharing through transfer price negotiation between 
supply chain firms. The impact of government incentive policy is also integrated into our model. Our study 
is different from previous studies because of our multiple sustainable constraints model, which has 
introduced public health constraint into our equation from the triple bottom line dimensions. Our study can, 
therefore, combine broader aspects of sustainable supply chain system. We emphasize both perspectives of 
supply chain firms’ decision-making and policy-making for reducing pollutant emissions. In doing so, our 
study will focus on the mechanism as to how to motivate supply chain firms to improve their environmental 
and social performances as well as their investment decisions in responding to the sustainable constraints. 
Table 1 summaries the main studies in the area for comparison. 
 The Table outlining the comparison of this work with respect of the other published 
studies (especially the Ding et al. (2016)) is greatly recommended to clearly mark the 
contribution of this paper. Table should be included at the end of literature section. This 
will clearly help out the reader to the view the contribution of this paper.(reviewer 2#) 
Table 1 Comparison between this research and previous studies 
This research work Contributions 
Collaborative mechanism on profit 
allotment and public health for a 
sustainable supply chain 
 
This study investigates how firms can achieve the balance between 
economic feasibility and environmental and social sustainability in the 
triple bottom line dimensions. It investigates the joint impact of 
multiple sustainable constraints on optimal policy through supply 
chain transfer pricing and profit allotment decisions that are 
interrelated with the government policies. In particular, social 
responsibility in terms of public health cost constrain is incorporated 
into our model.  
Journal publications  
Assessing the economic performance 
of an environmental sustainable 
supply chain in reducing 
environmental externalities (Ding et 
al., 2016, EJOR) 
The paper formulated a quantitative model of an integrated supply 
chain that incorporates only environmentally sustainable constraint to 
optimize supply chain firms’ operational strategies of producing 
environmental friendly products. However, the supply chain transfer 
price and profit allotment decisions, and social responsibility 
dimension are not considered in the study. 
Pricing strategy of environmental 
sustainable supply chain with 
internalizing externalities (Ding et al., 
2015, IJPE) 
The paper focused on optimal pricing strategies for environmentally 
sustainable supply chains and the relationship between firms’ 
environmental performance and government policies, without 
considering a sustainable constraint.  
Lifecycle approach to assessing 
environmental friendly product 
project with internalizing 
environmental externality (Ding et 
al., 2014, JCP) 
The paper focused on the mechanism of how firms can voluntarily 
produce the environmental friendly product (EFP) to remedy negative 
externalities. It examined the relationship between policy incentives 
and economic performance of the EFP, and the impact of the 
government polices on the EFP’s commercial feasibility and process 
of internalizing externalities. However, supply chain models were not 
their focal point. 
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Quariguasi et al., 2009, EJOR; 
Klassen and Vachon, 2003, 
Production and Operations 
The papers investigated the environmental behavior of partner firms in 
the supply chain and optimal solutions balancing environmental, 
social, and economic benefits. However, the studies did not consider 
the interactive effects of government policy, or stakeholders’ 
environmental and public health interests.  
Kumar et al., 2014, Omega; Yalabik 
and Fairchild, 2011, IJPE; Chiu and 
Yong, 2004, JCP; Matthews and 
Lave, 2000, Environmental Science 
& Technology; Holmgren and Amiri, 
2007, Energy Policy; Longa, et al. 
2008, Ecological Economics 
The papers examined the impacts of consumer, regulatory, and 
competitive pressures on supply chain firms’ green technology 
investment to reduce environmental externalities. They suggested that 
government legislation is an effective way to force firms bearing the 
social costs and improving their environmental and social 
performances.  However, the supply chain transfer price and profit 
allotment decisions were not considered by these studies.  
Formentini and Taticchi, 2015, JCP The paper proposed an empirical investigation using seven case studies 
on the governance mechanisms that are associated with supply chains 
and sustainability. However, it is unclear in relation to how corporate 
sustainability approaches are implemented and aligned with 
governance mechanisms at the supply chain level.  
Arani et al., 2016, IJPE; Becker-Peth 
and Thonemann, 2016, EJOR; Batarfi 
et al. 2016, Applied Mathematical 
Modelling; Feng et al., 2014, IJPE; 
Wei and Choi, 2010, EJOR; Lakhal, 
2006, EJOR; Giannoccaro and 
Pontrandolfo, 2004,IJPE 
The papers proposed frameworks and methodology for profit sharing 
and transfer pricing among the supply chain members. They addressed 
the decisions regarding optimal pricing, enabling maximization of the 
total profit of the whole supply chain. Pricing and profit sharing 
scheme were explored under the mean-variance decision framework, 
and revenue-sharing option contracts were introduced to coordinate 
supply chains. However, they did not consider a sustainable constraint.  
Cruz et al., 2008, IJPE The paper developed a framework to analyze the optimal allocation of 
resources to corporate social responsibility activities in a supply chain 
network. However, the environmental and social performances of 
production behavior were not considered. 
Hsueh, 2008, EJOR; Carter and 
Jennings, 2002, Transportation 
Research; Matus et al., 2012, Global 
environmental change; Kan et al., 
2012, Environment international  
The papers established a relationship between CSR and supply chain 
combining case study and survey approaches. They evaluated the 
profit of coordination between manufacturers on CSR using 
mathematical models. Most of the studies on public health focused on 
its negative impact of air pollution. But the issue as to how supply 
chain firms are committed to reduce public health loss was not studied. 
 
3. Sustainable supply chain collaborative mechanism on profit allotment  
In the following section, we formulate supply chain models in the cases of non-cooperation and 
collaborative decision-making while introducing the EFPs, in which the supply chain firms’ business 
decisions are subject to constraints representing stakeholders’ sustainability interests in view of the triple 
bottom line dimensions. We also discuss how the constraints affect government subsidy rates, supply chain 
firms’ decision behaviors concerning the EFPs’ sales quantities, price, and supply chain profit allotment.  
3.1 Description of Triple-dimension Sustainable Constraints 
In this study, we consider the communities, government, and consumers as the major stakeholders, and 
characterize their environmental preferences and social interests by means of multiple sustainable 
constraints that may be classified into two types: the first one represents environmental sustainable aspects 
including environment carrying capacity (environmental standards), regulation, market preference 
(consumers’ environmental awareness); the second represents social aspect in terms of public health safety 
responsibility. For eco-environment to be sustainable, supply chain firms’ business activities must comply 
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with the sustainable constraints. However, in a supply chain this is not an individual firm’s responsibility; 
rather, it needs collaboration among all supply chain partners. We take it for granted that each of the supply 
chain partners must comply with the sustainable constraints that affect its and also other partners’ behaviors, 
environmental and social performances as well. The sustainable constraints that characterize the 
environmental and social interests of the stakeholders are presented in the following sections.  
3.1.1 Environmental sustainable constraints  
Ding et al. (2016) presented the environmental sustainable constrains including three views: 
environmental carrying capacity, regulation and consumers’ preference. This study will use the definitions 
including environmental constraint (presented by environmental carrying capacity), regulation constraint, 
and market constraint that are defined in Ding et al (2016). Without environmental standards, the financial 
burdens of environmental cleaning and restoring on the government are substantial. The government 
accordingly imposes penalties on pollution and provided subsidies to green investments to drive and 
motivate the firms’ improvement in their environmental and social performances. The pollutants can then 
be prevented at the source so that their destructive impacts on society are significantly reduced or 
eliminated. From the perspective of market demand, a consumer’s preference reflects the market constraint 
in the sense that EFPs’ total costs of purchase and usage do not exceed that of environmentally unfriendly 
products (EUFPs). In reality, consumers who are environmental awareness exert pressure on supply chain 
firms to improve their sustainable practices, and they have a trade-off between buying EFPs and paying an 
affordable price premium.  
 not convinced that the current paper leads us to have new insights into the roles of CSR 
in a supply chain system ……. should consider a more realistic supply chain system 
(e.g., two suppliers-one manufacturer or so) to make a good contribution as it addresses 
the interaction between multiple participants given this CSR context. (reviewer 3#) 
3.1.2 Public health constraint  
From the perspective of social society, our research adds a new sustainable constraint. Public health 
constraint refers to government policy that guides supply chain firms to perform their corporate social 
responsibility by being environmentally friendly and reducing negative externality impacts on the public 
health so that loss of public health caused by pollutants can be reduced in the long run. Increased public 
healthcare cost is the result of decreasing environment quality caused by polluting production of the supply 
chain firms. Imposing a public health constraint will compel supply chain firms to reduce public health loss 
with their environmental commitment. In doing so, we can analyze the impact of public healthcare 
constraint on the supply chain firms’ CSR behavior and decision and social impact. We assume that 
without the environmental legislations, public healthcare cost will increase due to supply chain firms’ 
environmentally unfriendly behaviors. These increased public healthcare costs are partially borne by the 
government subsidy supporting medical expenses.  
3.2 Modelling Assumptions and Notations 
3.2.1 Assumptions 
(1) Consider a two-echelon supply chain that consists of one manufacturer with one supplier and produces 
a single product. The manufacturer sells finished goods to the market (consumers), the supplier provides 
intermediate products to the manufacturer, and correspondingly, one unit of the finished goods consumes ν 
units of the intermediate products. The manufacturer’s production is operated on the basis of make-to-order 
strategy. 
(2) Consider two situations: 1) Assume that without sustainability constraints, the supply chain firms only 
produce EUFPs and sell them in the competitive market, and EUFPs’ production runs at capacity in 
accordance with the market share; 2) Enforced by government policies, the supply chain firms would 
collaboratively introduce EFPs by engaging in green technology investment. Such additional investment 
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increases the cost of producing the EFPs, resulting in a cost disadvantage when compared with the EUFP in 
the competitive market.  
(3) To motivate supply chain firms to actively improve their environmental and social performances, the 
government imposes penalty for EUFPs’ production and provides subsidies to encourage green investment, 
thereby reducing the EFP’s cost disadvantage in the marketplace. By taking corporate social responsibility 
into account in terms of preventing the loss of public health, we assume that the government also levies tax 
on loss of public health to compensate for increased public healthcare cost. Based on the logic that only the 
additional costs of pollution prevention are to be compensated, we assume that the government subsidies 
should only partially compensate supply chain firms’ average incremental costs for producing EFPs and are 
only granted until the supply chain firms’ breaks-even. We also assume that the government subsidies are 
granted to the manufacturer by going through the consumers (i.e., the manufacturer obtains the subsidy 
only after it has sold the products to the consumers), and the manufacturer shares the subsidies with the 
supplier through adjustment of the transfer price.  
(4) We assume that the EFPs’ sales quantities are unlikely to run at the full production capacity of 
manufacturer when it is still new to the market. Instead, upon expecting promotion by government policies 
and consumers’ changing environmental preferences, they will increase gradually with a forecasted growth 
rate through its diffusion process. Meanwhile, the EFPs will gradually replace the EUFPs in the 
marketplace. As the EFPs’ sales quantities increase, the EUFPs’ sales decrease until they are fully replaced. 
We also assume that, with an additional investment in production of the EFPs, the manufacturer operates in 
a flexible manufacturing system in which production capacity is compatible with its market share, so that a 
flexible change of production quantity of the EFPs becomes possible.  
 assume that the firms can flexibly change e
tQ at each time. In fact, changing from EUFP 
to EFP sometimes needs extra process or equipment, which may yield a constraint that 
e
tQ  is limited to a certain capacity related to the process or equipment. What do the 
authors think about the firms' model of controlling e
tQ ? (reviewer 1#)  
(5) To analyze the sustainable supply chain, we consider the two situations of either non-cooperation 
supply chain or collaborative supply chain. In the non-cooperation case, the supply chain firms make their 
decision independently. There are no environmental constraints. The supply chain firms only produce the 
EUFPs and sell them in the competitive market, implying that without any environmental and social 
concerns, the supply chain firms are unlikely to have any motivation to cooperatively improve their 
environmental and social performances. In a collaborative case, government enforces legislation by setting 
environment standard constraints that represent the maximum levels of pollutant allowed at an 
environmentally acceptable level, and also provides incentives so that the manufacturer and supplier 
collaboratively introduce production of the EFPs through environmental technology investment.  
It maybe not common assuming a supply chain with one manufacturer and one supplier. Considering 
the complexity with multiple suppliers, our study would be advanced in handling both cases with one and 
multiple suppliers. Based on one supplier case analysis, the multiple suppliers’ case will be addressed in 
Section 6 for gaining the insight of the problem solution. 
 assumption that the supply chain consists of one manufacturer and one supplier is not 
common …… justify the assumption and discuss effects in case of multiple suppliers. 
(reviewer 1#) 
3.2.2 Parameter notations  
Based on the notions used in previous studies (Ding et al., 2014, 2016), we add new notations following:  
Q = EUFPs’ average annual demand (market share) that matches production capacity of manufacturer 
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uQ  = EUFPs’ sales quantity (
uQ = Q without EFPs; 
eu QQQ  with EFPs) 
u
mP  = Sales price of EUFPs 
u
sP  = Transfer price for EUFPs (i.e., manufacturer’s unit purchase cost)  
mB  = Government incentive policy to EFPs per unit in proportion to average incremental cost for 
environmental protection under collaborative supply chain  
sm II ,  = Initial investment of green project from the manufacturer and supplier 
e
m
u
m CC ,  = Variable cost of manufacturer per unit of EUFPs and EFPs 
e
m
u
m WW ,  = Pollutant disposal cost of manufacturer per unit of EUFPs and EFPs 
e
m
u
m EE ,  = Pollutant emission of manufacturer per unit of EUFPs and EFPs 
e
s
u
s CC ,  = Variable cost of supplier per unit of intermediate products for EUFPs and EFPs 
e
s
u
s WW ,  = Pollutant disposal cost of supplier per unit of intermediate products for EUFPs and EFPs 
e
s
u
s EE ,  = Pollutant emission of supplier per unit of intermediate products for EUFPs and EFPs 
u
s
u
m FF ,  = Government penalties imposed on EUFPs per unit output of manufacturer and supplier  
Y  = Environmental carrying capacity (representing emission standards) allocated to supply chain 
system 
eu ZZ ,  = Environmental cleaning and restoring costs borne by government to keep the environment at a 
self-healing standard for EUFPs and EFPs  
eu UU ,  = Lifecycle usage cost per unit of EUFPs and EFPs 
u
s
u
m HH ,  = Total healthcare cost for loss of public health caused by pollutant emission per unit of EUFPs 
by manufacturer and supplier respectively 
u
s
u
m  ,  = Pollution tax levied on public health loss caused per unit of EUFPs by manufacturer and 
supplier respectively 
sm V,V  = Government healthcare subsidy to the healthcare cost of public health loss caused per unit of 
EUFPs by manufacturer and supplier respectively  
k = Sensitivity rate of consumer to environmental quality (0  k  1) 
g = Average annual growth rate of EFPs’ sales quantities 
n1 = Time point at which supply chain reaches economic break-even with the EFPs 
r = Interest rate 
b = Total coefficient of government incentive policy  
scsm NPVNPVNPV  ,,  = Net present value of EFPs for manufacturer, supplier, and supply chain 
system 
3.2.3 Decision variable notations 
eQ  = Annual sales quantity (EFP) of manufacturer  
e
mP  = Annual sales price (EFP) of manufacturer 
  = Annual coefficient of government subsidy per unit of EFPs  
β = Incentive policy transmitted to supplier based on the average incremental cost per unit of its output 
for EFPs 
)(bPes  = Transfer price for EFP 
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In the following sections, we present a model framework that explicitly incorporates the sustainable 
constraints in view of triple bottom line dimensions and helps explore stakeholders’ interrelations and 
supply chain firms’ decision behaviors aligned with replacing EUFPs by EFPs when encouraged by 
government incentive policy.  
3.3 Structure of the Constraints 
Referring to Ding et al. (2014, 2016), the environmental constraint presents the following inequality 
meaning that the supply chain firms’ total pollution cannot exceed the emission allowance (regulation 
standards) allocated to the supply chain system: 
YEQQEQQEQEQ ust
e
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u
mt
e
t
e
st
e
t
e
mt
e
t  )()(  ,   t = 1, 2,…, n   (1.1) 
where eQQ   is EUFPs’ annual sales of product quantity that have not yet been replaced by EFPs. Taking 
into account social welfare and environmental externalities, regulations should conform to ecological 
sustainability (represented by the environmental carrying capacity). In order to allow for EFPs’ self-
sustaining marketing programs of promoting green products need to remain in place for a sufficiently long 
period of time.  
Distinct from previous studies, the corporate social responsibility constraint (in terms of public health) is 
included in our mode that can be presented as follows:  
)(])[( stmt
u
st
u
mt
e
t VVQHHQQ      t = 1, 2,…, n  
 (1.2) 
By assuming that the government offers a limited amount of healthcare subsidy to compensate the public 
healthcare cost caused by EUFPs, the inequality Eq. (1.2) states that in the supply chain the total healthcare 
cost for loss of public health caused by EUFPs that have not yet been replaced (on the left hand side) 
should not be over the government healthcare subsidy allocated on the basis of the supply chain’s 
production capacity (on the right hand side). We also assume that collected public health taxes levied on 
the EUFPs are fully used to compensate the public healthcare cost in terms of the healthcare subsidy. The 
implication of the corporate social responsibility (public health) constraint is that without the enforced 
environmental legislation, the increased public healthcare cost caused by the EUFPs is not accounted for by 
firms; as we infer, it is partially borne by the government healthcare subsidy that supports the increased 
medical expenses. On the contrary, if the inequality Eq. (1.2) does not hold, it then means that for a given 
level of government healthcare subsidy, the public health condition will be getting worse with high 
healthcare costs caused by the pollution. With the introduction of EFPs motivated by the government 
policies and as the EUFPs are replaced, the healthcare cost is reduced and must be confined to the limited 
amount of government healthcare subsidy allocated to the supply chain system.  
Considering the important role of government policies in reducing environmental externalities, 
government subsidy is explicitly introduced into the sustainable supply chain model to evaluate the 
financial feasibility of EFPs’ production in terms of reaching a break-even, and to asses its effectiveness of 
enabling supply chain firms’ improvement in their environmental and social performances. In reality, 
however, the government subsidy to firms’ green investments is restricted by financial burdens and should 
therefore be subject to an upper limit. Thus, the regulation constraint need to reflect the financial feasibility 
that the government subsidy offered must be less than the government’s savings in environmental 
externality cost, which can be presented as follows: 
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  t  n1  (2.1) 
As seen above, on the right-hand side of the inequality, the first item presents the government’s saved 
environmental cleaning and restoring costs, the second item group is the government’s saved healthcare 
subsidy to the healthcare cost caused by pollution, the third item group is the reduced penalty cost and 
public health tax due to replacement of EUFPs by EFPs. Parameter b (b < 1) ensures that the amount of 
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government subsidy is less than the reduced environmental externality costs. t  n1 means the government 
subsidy only applies until the supply chain firms reach break-even. As presumed above, the manufacturer 
obtains subsidy from the government through consumers and part of this subsidy is passed on to the 
supplier through transfer price negotiation. Following the study of Ding et al. (2014), with the 
consideration that the additional cost of producing the EFPs should only be partially compensated, we 
consider that the government subsidy per unit is proportional to  (with t <1) average incremental cost of 
the manufacturer for producing the EFPs, which is presented following: 
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(2.2) 
where )(estP  is the EFPs’ transfer price, including compensation for the supplier’s incremental cost for 
environmental protection. In a sustainable supply chain, the supplier should also take its responsibility for 
collaborative investment in green technologies. In order to compensate for its incremental cost, the supplier 
likely increases the transfer price (i.e., u
s
e
s P)(P  ) through negotiations with the manufacturer (Ding et 
al., 2015). For simplicity, by taking annual mean values of other parameters, it is defined as follows:  
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where
u
sP ,
u
sC , and
e
sC are estimated based on their mean values, and 
e
tQ is determined by either the 
environmental constraint or the public health constraint (see Section 4). By simplifying Eq. (2.2), 
substituting Eq. (3) into it, and combing with Eq. (2.1), the regulation constraint is rewritten as the 
following:  
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(4) 
 First, why does not the government enter the negotiation process? Second, the 
government can decide  by maximizing the social welfare, is it better than the process of 
negotiation of the transfer price interrelated with the government subsidy sharing between 
the supplier and the manufacturer? (reviewer 2#) 
Our model assumes that the government subsidy goes to the manufacturer only when its final products 
are purchased and consumed by the customers. The government negotiates subsidy rate t (decision 
variable) with the manufacturer every year, t decreases as etQ increases. Based on which, the 
determination of t  in Eq. (4) depends on how the government subsidy (measured per unit of the EFPs) is 
shared (via negotiation) between supply chain firms. In other words, the manufacturer is willingly to share 
the government subsidy with the supplier at what portion (represented by  as decision variable), that also 
satisfies the supplier. The transfer price can be then determined based upon negotiating  and optimizing 
sales quantity of the EFPs.  
For different types of consumers in the process of making purchasing decisions, environmental 
consciousness may differ. More often, consumers balance a trade-off concerning whether to buy the EFPs 
(paying a price premium) or not, which depends on how they are environmentally conscious or price 
sensitive. The consumers who are price sensitive likely choose the EUFPs (even though they may be 
environmental awareness) when they feel paying a higher price is unaffordable. For having EFPs gain 
market acceptance, their cost disadvantage due to additional investment needs to be diminished in a way 
during their lifecycle. We thus assume that, for an individual consumer, the total purchase and usage costs 
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for EFPs do not exceed that of EUFPs. Accordingly, taking into account the consumers’ environmental 
interests, the market constraint is written as follows: 
       (5) 
where k denotes the consumer’s sensitivity to environmental quality (0  k  1), the situation for k=1 is 
uncommon (only sensitive to environmental quality) in reality and thus is not considered in our study. The 
higher the value of k, the more concerned consumers are with environmental awareness and the less 
sensitive they are to price premiums. The market constraint implies umt
e
mt PP  , and preferably with 
u
t
e
t UU  . 
3.4 Structure of the Objective Functions 
Referring to Ding et al. (2015), we formulate the objective functions of producing EFPs by 
considering the cases of non-cooperation and collaborative supply chains. In the case of non-cooperation, 
the manufacturer and the supplier make the decision to maximize their own profits. In this case we assume 
that, owing to lack of environmental pressures, the supply chain firms only produce the EUFP, and with no 
environmental sustainable constraints, government policy does not play a role either. As mentioned above, 
due to EFPs’ cost disadvantage compared to EUFPs in the competitive market, supply chain firms would 
not have an intention to produce EFPs. In order to have supply chain firms collaboratively engage in green 
investments of EFPs, the government offers a subsidy to EFPs and imposes a penalty and public health tax 
for EUFPs in the direction of reducing pollutant emissions. In this way, the supply chain firms are 
motivated to work together, in the case of collaboration, as an integrated system to comply with the 
sustainable constraints. With introducing the EFPs and also taking into account the opportunity cost (lost 
revenue) and savings (saved penalty cost and public health tax) arising from replacing the EUFPs by the 
EFPs, the incremental net present values of the manufacturer, supplier, and collaborative supply chain 
during finite time periods n are presented respectively as follows: 
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From above we note that the supply chain firms’ operating profits consist of two parts, i.e., profits 
earned from the EFPs and profits lost (deduction) due to the replacement of the EUFPs by the EFPs. To 
simplify the calculation, following the study of Ding et al (2014), we assume that, stimulated by 
government incentive policy and consumers’ preference of environmental quality, the EFPs’ sales 
quantities go through their initial development period by increasing with a growth rate g. With market 
diffusion the EFPs’ sales quantities follow the relations of )1()1( gQQ
e
t
e
t    for any of two consecutive 
time periods and ete
t QgQ 1
1)1(   for n1 time periods, 
eQ1 is the sales quantity of the EFPs in the first 
time period. By substituting 
e
tQ with its relation of 
eQ1 and rewriting the EFPs’ accumulative sales 
quantities during the initial development period as   ggQQ nent
t
e
t ]11[
11
11



, and on the substitution 
of Eqs. (2.2) and (3) into Eqs. (6.1)–(6.3), together with Eqs. (1.1)–(1.2), (4), and (5), the maximized 
objective function represented by the incremental net present value of the collaborative supply chain that 
produces the EFPs during n1 time periods is formulated as the following:  
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where 0  t < 1, 0 < β < 1. We study the financial feasibility of producing the EFPs under sustainable 
constraints while explicitly incorporating effects of the government’s environmental and public health 
policies. NPV  is a net profit (or loss) due to replacing the EUFPs with the EFPs, where the opportunity 
costs for replacing EUFPs (including lost revenues and saved penalty costs) are taken into account. 
However, it should be noted that annual fixed costs in terms of depreciations of the uncovered investment 
of the EUFPs are not considered here, therefore, the lost revenues are overestimated. Noting that the EFPs’ 
operations actually go through a dynamic process along with its market diffusion, there is a need to 
determine the EFP’s optimal sales quantities during a transition period toward break-even. The motive of 
the current study is to address the EFPs’ optimal sales quantity, sales price, transfer price, and government 
subsidy sharing that push NPV of the collaborative supply chain to reach its break-even ( NPV = 0) 
during finite time periods n1. The model analysis will be presented in the next section. 
4. Model Analysis  
The overall objective is to cognize operational strategies for optimizing the supply chain firms’ business 
policies and the stakeholders’ interests, and address the profit allotment and the transfer price in sustainable 
supply chain collaboration, which are presented in the optimization model by maximizing the net present 
value of a collaborative supply chain with the sustainable constraints including emission standard, public 
health, regulation, and consumer’s preference. By formulating the Lagrange function with the Kuhn–
Tucker conditions, also together with game approach, the supply chain firms’ optimal decisions complying 
with the sustainable constraints that include the new dimension of public health are derived below.  
4.1 Manufacturers’ Price Decisions 
Using the Kuhn–Tucker conditions, it can be shown that the manufacturers’ optimal sales price *emtP  is 
determined as follows:  
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mt       (8) 
The equation above indicates the sales price of EFPs is no less than EUFPs with k  0. This means that 
the higher the consumers’ environmental quality concern and the lower the lifecycle usage costs of EFPs, 
the higher their preferences are for EFPs. That is to say, the consumers that prefer EFPs are often willing to 
pay a price premium.  
4.2 Manufacturers’ Product Quantity Decisions 
Notice that manufacturers’ product quantity decision needs to match the consumers’ demand with 
purchased finished goods. According to the complementary conditions, distinct from previous studies by 
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introducing public health constraint, we can show that the initial optimal sales quantity (t=1), denoted by
*
1
eQ , can be determined by either of the following equations that has a larger quantity as shown in Eq. 
(9.3): 
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where *
1
e
EQ and
*
1
e
HQ  stand for the optimal initial sale quantity of the EFPs derived from Eq. (9.1) and Eq. 
(9.2) respectively. As shown above, 
*
1
eQ is determined by the larger among Eqs. (9.1) and (9.2). We can 
observe that both the constraints of environmental standard and public health affect the manufacturers’ 
initial optimal sales quantities, it means that 
*
1
eQ depends on either the total pollutant emissions or the total 
healthcare costs for loss of public health that need to be reduced for compliance with either the 
environmental standard constraint or the public health constraint. We should notice that the larger initial 
sale quantity among *
1
e
EQ and
*
1
e
HQ will satisfy both the constraints. Eq. (9.1) shows that emission 
allowance allocated to the supply chain system is fully consumed by emissions from both EFPs and EUFPs, 
which implies that the emissions become restrained with compliance of the environmental constraint. 
Similarly Eq. (9.2) shows that during the first production period of the EFPs, the healthcare cost for loss of 
public health caused by the EUFPs also simply consumes the entire government healthcare subsidy 
allocated. 
4.3 Government Incentive Policy Decisions 
The government incentive policy in terms of subsidy is offered to compensate for supply chain firms’ 
incremental costs incurred for the reduction of pollutants and public health losses, its purpose is to help the 
firms overcome EFPs’ cost disadvantage during the market diffusion period. The analytical results show 
that the net present value of a supply chain increases for a marginal increase in the net environmental cost 
savings of government by reducing pollutant emissions and public health losses. This implies that both 
regulations and incentive policy jointly make essential efforts in enabling supply chain firms to invest in 
green technologies. The optimal value of government subsidy rate 
*
t is determined as follows:  
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where *1
eQ is determined by Eq. (9), and )(Pes  is determined by Eq. (3), in turn depending on the optimal 
value of . As mentioned above, it can be seen that the annual coefficient of the government subsidy is 
negatively related to the accumulative incremental costs of supply chin firms. This implies that the less the 
value of t , the longer the EFPs need to take to reach break-even. Generally speaking, t will decrease 
as the EFPs’ sales quantity gradually increases by time periods. This is intuitively true since with growth of 
the EFPs’ sales through market diffusion the less government subsidy is needed for compensating 
incremental costs of the EFPs’ production. The government will reduce the subsidy by time periods and 
cease it when the NPVs of supply chain firms reach break-even at time point t = n1. The transfer price 
decision is based on negotiations of government subsidy sharing between supply chain members, i.e., the 
determination of the optimal value of . 
4.4 Transfer Price Decision in Collaborative Supply Chains 
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Substituting Eq. (9.3) into Eq. (6.1) and (6.2), we can obtain the incremental net present values of the 
manufacturer and supplier in collaboration (with the optimal sales quantity) denoted by *
mNPV  and 
*
sNPV . As the overall benefit of the integrated supply chain system is optimum, the supply chain 
members will collaborate only if all the individual members are satisfied, i.e., the following inequalities 
must hold:  
0*mNPV  and 0
*
sNPV    (11) 
Eq. (11) means that, when compared with the non-cooperation case, a collaborative supply chain 
producing the EFPs will have better incremental net present values for both the manufacturer and the 
supplier; this implies that the above inequalities are the necessary prerequisites for a lasting collaborative 
relationship between the manufacturer and supplier. The manufacturer and supplier have to coordinate the 
transfer price )(esP  or negotiate a unique value of   that satisfies them both. Since the determination of β 
goes through a negotiation process between the supply chain partners, we employ the Rubinstein game 
approach (1982) to characterize the bargaining process. For simplicity of calculation, we use the annual 
mean value for the costs and sales price. From Eq. (11) we can obtain the lower and upper bounds of β 
denoted by βmin (from 0
*  sNPV ) and βmax (from 0
*  mNPV ) as follows:  
 On Eq. (12.1) and (12.2) in Section 4.3, I have no idea of why \beta_min is always 
smaller than \beta_max. Assuming very large values for Is and Im, we can find that 
\beta_min gets larger than \beta_max. (reviewer 1#) 
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where [βmin, βmax] is the feasible interval for finding the optimal value of β. βmin is the lowest portion of the 
government subsidy that the supplier would accept to reach its NPV break-even, at which the losses of the 
EFPs just offset by the profits earned from the EUFPs; βmax is the highest portion of the government 
subsidy that the manufacturer would share with the supplier, at which the manufacturer only gains its NPV 
break-even without earning any extra profits. Let x* (0x*1) be the manufacturer’s share of the profits 
while 1 − x* is the supplier’s share. Assuming an indefinite bargaining game between the manufacturer and 
supplier in our case, the manufacturer’s optimum profit-sharing ratio is expressed as x* = (1 − 2)/(1 − 12), 
where 1 and 2 are the discount factors of the manufacturer and supplier respectively (here, the discount 
factor is the patience degree of participants for 10  , which can be seen as the cost of bargaining). 
With the members in collaboration, the optimal value of  is obtained in terms of the ratio of the profit 
allocation between the supply chain members in the following manner:  
   
min
*
max
*minmax xx 


 


 )1(
1
1
21
2212*              (13) 
where β* denotes the optimal value of the coefficient of government subsidy to the supplier, and βmax and 
βmin are as shown in Eqs. (12.1) and (12.2). Based on determination of optimal value β*, the transfer price 
and government subsidy rates can then be determined. To ensure βmax > βmin, from Eqs. (12.1)-(12.2) we 
can obtain the following: 
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By rewriting Eq.(14) we have the following: 
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The above inequalities mean that the initial investments Im and Is have to be confined and should not be 
over the total of the supply chain’s accumulated incremental profit margins (including the government 
subsidies). Given other parameters, the supply chain will be able to achieve 0 SCNPV  corresponding to 
βmax > βmin. In other words, a very large initial investment without government subsidy is more likely to be 
financially infeasible for the EFPs. 
5. Numerical Analysis  
 introduce the real business scenario to match with the math model. In other words, are 
they representing a realistic/general case? Can the authors provide real industry 
examples representing the cases? It would strengthen the practical value of the work if 
the author provide real industry examples.(reviewer 2#) 
In this section, using hybrid vehicles as a case example we present numerical analysis to quantify the 
interplay effects of multiple sustainable constraints on the environmental behavior of supply chain firms, 
and assess the impact of government incentive policy on a surviving collaborative sustainable supply chain. 
The analytical model is applied to a project investment of hybrid vehicle that is carried out by an 
automobile manufacturer, and the managerial insights of supply chain firms’ environmental decisions on 
sustainable practice are provided.  
5.1 Data Generation 
The data employed (see Table 2) were calculated (proportionally or average???) based on the real 
market data of an automobile company that was involved in this research project. The company produces 
not only conventional vehicles, but also hybrid vehicles which has been gradually replacing the 
conventional ones. Therefore, the data employed is validity and reliability reflecting real business scenario. 
Using the real industrial example, the data analysis examines the effectiveness of the government policies 
that motivate the supply chain firms jointly investing in the hybrid vehicle production. The firms can then 
share the government subsidy through the transfer price negotiation. Our numerical example provides the 
insight of the effectiveness of government policies for given cost and price parameters of the EFPs, and 
illustrating the mechanism of supporting supply chain sustainability from the triple bottom line dimensions.   
Table 2. Initial investment cost and operating parameters 
Pollution prevention initial investment cost items Thousand 
Manufacturer’s investment (Im) 4,000,000 
Supplier’s investment (Is) 3,000,000 
Operating data items 
Item  
Thousand 
/Unit 
Item  
Thousand 
/Unit 
Item  Item Item  
Thousand 
/Year 
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u
mP  120 
u
sP  30 b 0.1 Y 12,000 
uZ  5,000,000 
e
mC  50 
e
sC  15 r 10% 
e
mE  
0.02/unit eZ  500,000 
u
mC  30 
u
sC  10 ν 2 
e
sE  0.01/unit   
u
mF  7 
u
sF  5 k 0.1 
u
mE  0.05/unit Item Quantity 
u
mtW  5 
u
stW  3 g
 8% usE  0.03/unit Q 140,000 
e
mtW  4 
e
stW  
2   
    
eU  15 uU  30   
    
u
mH  3.75 
u
sH  2.5       
u
m  
2.70 
u
s  
1.80 
  
    
2.43 1.63 
1.49 0.99 
mV  
2.60 
sV  
1.75 
  
    
2.43 1.63 
1.49 0.99 
 
By using the Rubinstein game approach, in the bargaining process between the supply chain members, 
the patience degrees (cost of bargain) of the manufacturer and the supplier are 2.01   and 5.02   
respectively (here we assume the manufacturer is less patient than the supplier in the bargaining process, 
which means the manufacturer’s bargain cost is higher for
21   ). Based on the reality that the impact of 
pollutant emissions on environment is often regionally dispersed, the public healthcare cost u
mH  and 
u
sH  
are estimated based on a regional survey with the assumption that they are in proportion to regional GDP, 
automotive vehicle volume, and automotive vehicles’ contribution to emissions. Public health tax and 
government public health subsidy are then estimated in proportion to the healthcare cost caused by 
environmental pollution. As for the public health tax and government public health subsidy, their 
parameters are given at three different levels, illustrated in three scenarios respectively, in order to see if 
there is any impact on optimal solution to the product quantity. In scenario 1 (corresponding to Table 3), 
public health subsidy is set to be 70% of healthcare cost with mV = 2.6, sV = 1.75, m = 2.7, and s = 1.8; 
in scenario 2 and 3 (corresponding to Table 4 and 5), the public health subsidy is 65% and 40% of 
healthcare cost with 
mV = 2.43, sV = 1.63, m = 2.43, s  = 1.63 and mV = 1.49, sV = 0.99, m = 1.49, 
s  = 0.99 respectively. As mentioned earlier, the collected public health taxes levied on the EUFPs are 
used to compensate the public healthcare cost in terms of the healthcare subsidy. In the numerical analysis, 
the optimal solutions to the hybrid vehicle project are quantified in terms of government subsidy rate, EFPs’ 
sales quantities, time to break-even, and self-sustainability.  
5.2 Results and Discussion 
Table 3, 4 and 5 present the results with time periods, including the EFPs’ optimal initial sales 
quantities until the break-even. As mentioned above, the optimal initial quantity of the EFPs equals the 
larger of either *1
e
EQ  or 
*
1
e
HQ  according to Eq. (9.3).  In our numerical illustration as shown in Table 3 
(scenario 1), with estimation of larger values of the government healthcare subsidy, we obtain 
*
1
*
1
*
1
e
H
e
E
e QQQ   in accordance with Eq. (9.1); in Table 4 and 5 (scenario 2 and 3), with estimation of 
lower values of the government healthcare subsidy at different tow levels and other things being equal, we 
have *1
*
1
*
1
e
E
e
H
e QQQ   in accordance with Eq.(9.2).  
Table 3   Numerical results of optimal solutions (Scenario 1, n1 = 6 years) 
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 )(* esP =34.16 thousand, *=0.452, 
*
1
*
1
*
1
e
H
e
E
e QQQ   ( mV =2.6, sV =1.75; m =2.7, s =1.8) 
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=9 t=10 
*e
tQ  48,571 52,457 56,654 61,186 66,081 71,367 77,077 83,243 89,902 97,095 
*e
mtP  
(thousand) 
150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
*
ta   0.213   0.194   0.176   0.159   0.144   0.130  0 0 0 0 
mtB  
(thousand) 
 7.545   6.858   6.223   5.635   5.090   4.585  0 0 0 0 
scNPV  
(million) 
 -5,505.56   -4,068.04   -2,683.71  
 -
1,349.13  
 -61.17   1,183.05   2,223.28   3,244.60  4,247.35   5,231.86  
mNPV  
(million) 
 -3,120.47   -2,286.69   -1,495.12   -742.52   -25.96   657.25   1,146.67   1,627.19  2,098.98   2,562.19  
sNPV   
(million) 
 -2,385.08   -1,781.35   -1,188.59   -606.61   -35.21   525.80   1,076.61   1,617.40  2,148.37   2,669.67  
 
Table 4 Numerical results of optimal solutions (Scenario 2, n1 = 6 years) 
 
)(* esP =34.19 thousand, *=0.457, 
*
1
*
1
*
1
e
E
e
H
e QQQ   ( mV =2.43, sV =1.63; m =2.43, s =1.63) 
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=9 t=10 
*e
tQ   48,960   52,877   57,107   61,675   66,610   71,938   77,693   83,909   90,622   97,871  
*e
mtP  
(thousand) 
150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
*
ta   0.212   0.193   0.175   0.158   0.143   0.129   -     -     -     -    
mtB  
(thousand) 
 7.491   6.810   6.180   5.596   5.056   4.555   -     -     -     -    
scNPV  
(million) 
 -5,523.14   -4,102.88   -2,735.49  
 -
1,417.55  
 -145.92   1,082.26   2,106.49   3,112.10  4,099.43   5,068.81  
mNPV  
(million) 
 -3,130.24   -2,306.04   -1,523.88   -780.53   -73.04   601.26   1,081.68   1,553.36  2,016.48   2,471.17  
sNPV   
(million) 
 -2,392.90   -1,796.83   -1,211.61   -637.02   -72.88   481.00   1,024.82   1,558.74  2,082.96   2,597.64  
 
Table 5  Numerical results of optimal solutions (Scenario 3, n1 = 4 years) 
 
)(* esP =33.72 thousand, *=0.416, 
*
1
*
1
*
1
e
E
e
H
e QQQ   ( mV =1.49, sV =0.99; m =1.49, s =0.99) 
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=9 t=10 
*e
tQ   84,480   91,238   98,537  106,420   114,934   124,129   134,059   140,000   140,000   140,000  
*e
mtP  
(thousand) 
150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
*
ta   0.106   0.094   0.084   0.074   -     -     -     -     -     -    
mtB  
(thousand) 
 3.63   3.23   2.87   2.53   -     -     -     -     -     -    
scNPV  
(million) 
 -4,918.97   -2,905.54   -955.75   933.99   2,608.93   4,253.41   5,868.00   7,400.85  8,794.35   10,061.17  
mNPV  
(million) 
 -2,796.39   -1,644.42   -540.44   518.88   1,378.50   2,222.48   3,051.12   3,837.81  4,552.98   5,203.14  
sNPV   
(million) 
 -2,122.58   -1,261.12   -415.32   415.11   1,230.43   2,030.93   2,816.88   3,563.04  4,241.37   4,858.03  
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As can be seen in Table 3, the NPVs of the supply chain firms break-even and begin to earn profits in 
year t = 6. The EFPs’ optimal sales price is 150 thousand RMB/vehicle. For given a relatively higher level 
of the government healthcare subsidy the annual optimal initial sales quantity is determined by 
environmental constraint with *1
*
1
*
1 48571
e
H
e
E
e QQQ  , and the optimal subsidy rate * gradually 
decreases from 0.213 to zero soon after 0NPV . That is, beyond the 6th year the government ceases its 
subsidy as soon as the supply chain becomes to earn a profit. The transfer price )(* esP  = 34.16 thousand 
RMB/unit with * = 0.452. 
In Table 4 and 5, with the same optimal product price, the NPVs of the supply chain system break-even 
in year 6 with 4857148960 *1
*
1
*
1 
e
E
e
H
e QQQ  (scenario 2), and in year 4 with *1
*
1
*
1 84480
e
E
e
H
e QQQ   
(scenario 3), respectively. Numerical results show that, for given relatively lower levels of the government 
healthcare subsidy and pollution tax, a larger initial sales quantity of the EFPs is produced with a smaller 
government subsidy required so that the optimal subsidy rate * decreases from 0.212 (scenario 2) or 0.106 
(scenario 3) (lower than 0.213 in scenario 1) to zero when NPV  reaches zero. The transfer price )(* esP
= 34.19 thousand RMB/unit with * = 0.457 in scenario 2. With even lower level of the government and 
healthcare subsidy and pollution tax, scenario 3 shows the initial sales quantity of the EFPs becomes even 
larger, therefore, the supply chain system reaches to its breaks-even much earlier in year 4, and the transfer 
price )(* esP = 33.72 thousand RMB/unit with * = 0.416 (lower than scenario 2). This implies that the 
supply chain system can reach break-even earlier and the transfer price tends to decrease along with a lower 
portion of the government subsidy transmitted to the supplier, when a larger optimal initial quantity of the 
EFPs determined by public health constraint corresponding to lower values of the government healthcare 
subsidy and pollution tax. As expected, during the first production period of the EFPs, the increased 
healthcare cost caused by the EUFPs consumes all of government healthcare subsidy. With the increase of 
the EFPs, the healthcare cost reduces and less government subsidy is consumed.  
From the results as shown above, some non-trivial findings are obtained reflecting interplay relations 
between the sustainable constraints. Particularly, the optimal initial sales quantities of the EFPs are affected 
by both the constraints of environmental standard and public health. Moreover, supply chain firms have 
trade-offs in determining the EFPs’ optimal operational strategy which reflects the insight of reducing 
environmental effects by replacing EUFPs with EFPs. That is, impelled by complying with the sustainable 
constraints and induced by government incentive policy, supply chain firms’ optimal operational decisions 
make a balance between gaining benefits from the government incentive policy and losing the profits of the 
EUFPs replaced by the EFPs through market diffusion periods. As for the regulation constraint, as EFPs’ 
production continues with increasing in sales volumes, the government subsidy per unit t  falls and 
reduces to zero when the EFP project breaks-even. As a crucial factor that affects supply chain firms’ 
environmental behavior, the government incentive policy is the key driver for motivating supply chain 
firms to take part in the green investments and improve their environmental and social performances. It 
needs to be emphasized that the government subsidy should not apply to any circumstances where profits 
are gained, and not to fully compensate the firms’ incremental cost either. The amount of subsidies sharing 
needs to be properly justified in order to effectively drive supply chain firms to innovate on their green and 
social activities and increase the eco-efficiency of the society. As for the market constraints, being aware of 
consumers’ environmental quality concerns, for given values of k (<1), the firms will likely charge a price 
premium as long as it is acceptable to the consumers. As for the consumers, they will be content using 
green products that comfort their green preferences with affordable total purchase and usage costs.  
In order to see the effect of incorporating public health factors on business behaviors of the supply chain 
firms, Table 6 presents the results in scenario 4 excluding public health factors.  
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Table 6 Numerical results of optimal solutions excluding public health factors (Scenario 4, n1 = 7 years) 
 
)(* esP =34.54 thousand, *=0.537, 
*
1
*
1
e
E
e QQ   
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=9 t=10 
*e
tQ  
48571 52457 56654 61186 66081 71367 77077 83243 89902 97095 
*e
mtP  
(thousand) 
150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
*
ta  
 0.224   0.204   0.185   0.167   0.151   0.136   0.123  0 0 0 
mtB  
(thousand) 
 7.565   6.878   6.243   5.655   5.110   4.605   4.138  0 0 0 
scNPV  
(million) 
 -
5,782.86  
 -
4,617.60  
 -
3,500.57  
 -
2,428.44  
 -
1,398.16  
 -406.93   547.80  1,324.47  2,087.02  2,835.70  
mNPV  
(million) 
 -
3,272.10  
 -
2,587.19  
 -
1,941.78  
 -
1,332.69  
 -757.03   -212.16   304.34   650.73   990.83  1,324.74  
sNPV  
(million) 
 -
2,510.76  
 -
2,030.41  
 -
1,558.79  
 -
1,095.75  
 -641.13   -194.77   243.47   673.74  1,096.19  1,510.96  
 
As for the impact of considering public health factors on the optimal operations policy, we obtain an 
important finding by comparing with the results in Table 3, 4 and 5, we can see that by including public 
healthcare factor so that driven by double effects from both environmental and public health constraints 
together with the saved penalties by replacing the EUFPs the time periods required for break-even of the 
supply chain tends to become short, as shown in Table 3, 4 and 5 (one year or three years shorter than the 
scenario 4 excluding public health factors in Table 6). This is intuitively true in the sense that the inclusion 
of public healthcare cost into the constraint actually has an active effect of internalizing environmental 
externality caused by the EUFPs, which drives the supply chain firms to be environmentally friendly with 
more production of the EFPs. an increase of the EFPs’ initial optimal sales quantity is driven by including 
public healthcare constraint, the values of * in scenarios 1-3 (Table 3, 4, and 5) are less than that in the 
case of excluding public healthcare cost as shown in scenario 4 (Table 6). The optimal portion of the 
supplier sharing the government subsidy and the transfer price in the scenario 1-3 including public 
healthcare constraint are smaller than those in scenario 4 excluding public health factors. The implication is 
that internalization of public healthcare cost increases initial production of the EFPs so that more EUFPs 
are replaced, which leads to less requirement for government subsidy. 
 
 According Table 2 and 3, \Delata NPV is negative for the first 5 years, and tuned into 
positive for the rest 5 years. During the ten years, total of \Delata NPV is not so large. 
What if the manufacture makes only EUFP against the policy of the government? 
(reviewer 1#) 
However, a question can be raised what if the manufacture only produces EUFPs rather than follows the 
government environmental policy. The manufacture has to then pay the penalty charges for its EUFPs 
production. Meanwhile, its sales quantities of the EUFPs must comply with the environmental constraint, 
therefore, its production quantities of the EUFPs maybe below its full production capacity. The production 
of the EUFPs per period complying with the environment constraint can be expressed as follows: 
YEQEQ ust
u
t
u
mt
u
t    or   )/(
u
st
u
mt
u
t EEYQ  , t = 1, 2,…, n   (16) 
The manufacturer would produce EUFPs at the allowed maximum quantity which is equal to
QEEYQ ust
u
mt
u
t  )/(  . In this case, when the manufacturer only produces the EUFPs with sales 
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quantity utQ during n periods, the net present values of the accumulated annual profits of the supply chain 
denoted by uscNPV  can be expressed as follows:  
rtu
t
n
t
u
st
u
st
u
st
u
st
u
mt
u
mt
u
mt
u
mt
u
mt
u
sc eQFWCFWCPNPV

  1 )]([         (17) 
where )/( ust
u
mt
u
t EEYQ  . However, without entering into the EFPs business, the manufacture will 
strategically lose an opportunity obtaining a long term benefit to gain business competitive advantage along 
with the triple dimensions. This can be illustrated by comparing uscNPV  and 
e
scNPV , the later is the net 
present value of the accumulated annual profits of producing the EFPs with the EUFPs gradually replaced 
(Ding et al., 2016), it can be expressed below:  
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(18) 
where on the right hand side of the equation, the first and second item groups respectively stand for the 
annual profits of the EFPs and the EUFPs that has not yet replaced. Comparing Eq.(17) and Eq.(18) we 
obtain the following: 
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For comparison, other things being equal, in the case of Scenario 1 with 48571*1
*
1 
e
E
e QQ our results 
in Table 7 show that 109091utQ , and in year t=3 the case of producing the EFPs to gradually replace the 
EUFPs becomes better than only producing the EUFP, which means that only producing EUFPs will lose a 
long term benefit. 
Table 7   Comparison of uscNPV  and 
e
scNPV  (Scenario 1) 
 48571*1
*
1 
e
E
e QQ , 109091utQ   ( mV =2.6, sV =1.75; m =2.7, s =1.8) 
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=9 t=10 
e
scNPV  -961.92  4,606.17  9,745.58  14,493.86  18,885.18  22,950.64  26,718.53  30,214.58  33,462.24  36,482.81  
u
scNPV  3540.50  6759.13  9685.16  12345.19  14763.39  16961.76  18960.28  20777.11  22428.78  23930.30  
e
scNPV -
u
scNPV  -4502.42  -2152.95  60.42  2148.67  4121.79  5988.88  7758.25  9437.47  11033.46  12552.51  
 
What does "the time periods required for break-even ... become short" mean in p. 17? I 
understand that the parameter n1 is given. However, this sentence implies that n1 is 
determined by \Delta NPV, which depends on public health factors. (reviewer 1#) 
(Addressed in the revision report, see comment 6)  
 
 should perform the worst-case analysis. (reviewer 1#) 
 The analysis is based on 8% of the growth rate. How is the result when the growth rate is 
decreased from 8% to 0% every year? The parameter k that is customers' positive 
impression on price of EFP is set to 0.1. How does a more negative parameter, e.g. 0.01, 
affect the result? (reviewer 1#) 
The most concern for the supply chain firms to produce EFPs is their potential business risks, i.e. how 
soon they can achieve at least a break-even within a certain time period. Considering the government 
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intervention for reducing the externality impact of environmental pollution and public health cost, the 
worst case would be that the EFPs can only reach the break-even point when the sales quantities reach 
their market share. The question is for how long the supply chain is willing to wait until reaching the 
break-even, the longer the risker that the manufacturer (the final product provider) will be. For 
instance, in our numerical analysis, the growth rate of the EFPs, g, is based on 8%, and the customers’ 
positive impression on price of the EFP, k, is set to 0.1 (see Table 2), which obtains positive results. 
We can expect that when g and k become lower, the time for the supply chain to reach break-even will 
be longer (see Table 8 and 9). The results show that the time for supply chain to make break-even is 
more sensitive to k (the consumers’ positive impression on price of the EFP) than to the growth rate g. 
This may explains that when k becomes lower, the consumers’ willingness to purchase the EFPs will 
reduce, as well as the EFP’s purchase price and sales, which has stronger negative impact on the 
supply chain’s profits. As for g, though the EFP’s sales quantities reduce as it decreases, both the sales 
and costs of the EFPs are influenced in a similar way, thus the growth rate has less impact on the 
profits. 
Table 8  Numerical results of sensitivity analysis (Scenario 1, g decreases from 0.08 to zero) 
 （g=0.08） )(* esP =34.16 thousand, *=0.452, 
*
1
*
1
*
1
e
H
e
E
e QQQ   ( mV =2.6, sV =1.75; m =2.7, s =1.8) 
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=9 t=10 
*e
tQ  48571 52457 56654 61186 66081 71367 77077 83243 89902 97095 
scNPV  
(million) 
 -5,505.56   -4,068.04   -2,683.71   -1,349.13   -61.17   1,183.05   2,223.28   3,244.60  4,247.35   5,231.86  
 （g=0.06） )(* esP =34.23 thousand, *=0.449, 
*
1
*
1
*
1
e
H
e
E
e QQQ   ( mV =2.6, sV =1.75; m =2.7, s =1.8) 
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=9 t=10 
*e
tQ   48,571   51,486   54,575   57,849   61,320   65,000   68,899   73,033   77,415   82,060  
scNPV  
(million) 
 -5,505.56   -4,087.77   -2,741.83   -1,463.27   -247.97   907.89   1,837.77   2,733.82  3,597.30   4,429.37  
 （g=0.04） )(* esP =34.30 thousand, *=0.446, 
*
1
*
1
*
1
e
H
e
E
e QQQ   ( mV =2.6, sV =1.75; m =2.7, s =1.8) 
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=9 t=10 
*e
tQ   48,571   50,514   52,535   54,636   56,822   59,095   61,458   63,917   66,473   69,132  
scNPV  
(million) 
 -5,505.56   -4,107.51   -2,799.24   -1,574.62   -427.98   645.95   1,475.40   2,259.60  3,001.03   3,702.02  
 （g=0.02） )(* esP =34.38 thousand, *=0.443, 
*
1
*
1
*
1
e
H
e
E
e QQQ   ( mV =2.6, sV =1.75; m =2.7, s =1.8) 
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=9 t=10 
*e
tQ   48,571   49,543   50,534   51,544   52,575   53,627   54,699   55,793   56,909   58,047  
scNPV  
(million) 
 -5,505.56   -4,127.24   -2,855.93   -1,683.22   -601.39   396.68   1,134.91   1,819.44  2,454.20   3,042.78  
 （g=0.01） )(* esP =34.42 thousand, *=0.441, 
*
1
*
1
*
1
e
H
e
E
e QQQ   ( mV =2.6, sV =1.75; m =2.7, s =1.8) 
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=9 t=10 
*e
tQ   48,571   49,057   49,548   50,043   50,544   51,049   51,560   52,075   52,596   53,122  
scNPV  
(million) 
 -5,505.56   -4,137.11   -2,884.00   -1,736.50   -685.67   276.63   972.48   1,611.40  2,198.04   2,736.69  
 （g=0） )(* esP =34.46 thousand, *=0.439, 
*
1
*
1
*
1
e
H
e
E
e QQQ   ( mV =2.6, sV =1.75; m =2.7, s =1.8) 
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=9 t=10 
*e
tQ  48571  48571  48571  48571  48571  48571  48571  48571  48571  48571  
scNPV  
(million) 
 -5,505.56   -4,146.98   -2,911.90   -1,789.10   -768.38   159.55   815.07   1,411.00  
1,952.7
6  
 2,445.26  
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Table 9   Numerical results of sensitivity analysis (Scenario 1, k decreases from 0.08 to 0.01) 
 
（k=0.08, g=0.08） *e
mP =146.74 thousand, )(
* esP =33.44 thousand, *=0.373,  
*
1
*
1
*
1
e
H
e
E
e QQQ   ( mV =2.6, sV =1.75; m =2.7, s =1.8) 
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=9 t=10 
scNPV  
(million) 
 -5,649.54   -4,353.40   -3,107.86  
 -
1,909.56  
 -755.40   357.46   1,268.71   2,163.40  3,041.82   3,904.27  
 
（k=0.05, g=0.08） *e
mP  =142.11 thousand, )(
* esP =32.41 thousand, *=0.281,  
*
1
*
1
*
1
e
H
e
E
e QQQ   ( mV =2.6, sV =1.75; m =2.7, s =1.8) 
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=9 t=10 
scNPV  
(million) 
 -5,854.16   -4,758.90   -3,710.60  
 -
2,705.96  
 -1,741.93   -815.75   75.12   789.86  1,491.60   2,180.59  
 
（k=0.02, g=0.08） *e
mP =137.76 thousand, )(
* esP =31.44 thousand, *=0.180,  
*
1
*
1
*
1
e
H
e
E
e QQQ   ( mV =2.6, sV =1.75; m =2.7, s =1.8) 
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=9 t=10 
scNPV  
(million) 
 -6,046.24   -5,139.58   -4,276.45  
 -
3,453.59  
 -2,668.06   -1,917.12   -1,198.32   -509.38   151.77   677.91  
 
（k=0.01, g=0.08） *e
mP =136.36 thousand, )(
* esP =31.13 thousand, *=0.141,  
*
1
*
1
*
1
e
H
e
E
e QQQ   ( mV =2.6, sV =1.75; m =2.7, s =1.8) 
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=9 t=10 
scNPV  
(million) 
 -6,107.68   -5,261.34   -4,457.44  
 -
3,692.74  
 -2,964.29   -2,269.42   -1,605.65   -970.74   -362.64   220.52  
 
Another issue that needs to be addressed concerns the way of granting the government subsidy, which is 
explored as a unique finding of our study. There is an argument regarding whether it is better to grant the 
government subsidy directly to a supply chain firm (manufacturer) or not, which is not intuitively sensed. 
As mentioned earlier, we assume that the government grants the subsidy to a manufacturer by going 
through the consumers; this means the manufacturer will obtain a subsidy only after selling the products to 
the consumers. This is so because there is the need for ensuring that in practice the EFPs must be used by 
consumers to replace the EUFPs so that the reduction of pollutant emissions can be realized. Moreover, one 
may argue that if the government subsidies are granted directly to the manufacturer without going through 
the consumers in a local country, the manufacturer may sell its product overseas allowing the overseas 
consumers to benefit from the government subsidy. This would not be the intention of the government in 
any country, particularly where environmental pollution is happening locally. In this sense, the government 
policy incentives should normally go to subsidizing local consumers to reduce environmental pollutions 
and public health losses locally.  
From views of environmental and social societies, another aspect that remains to be examined is how to 
properly set environmental standards and healthcare subsidies to the healthcare cost of public health loss. 
Since the status quo of environmental carrying capacity and public health naturally depend on the 
circumstances and characteristics of the local environment, the environmental standards should be set low 
enough in order to safely protect the environment; as for public healthcare subsidies to the healthcare cost 
incurred by environmental pollution, its setting might be much more complicated. These issues need further 
investigation. 
6. Sustainable supply chain modeling with multiple suppliers  
We will develop our above analysis in the current section by addressing the case with multiple suppliers 
sustainable supply chain, which consists of one manufacturer and two suppliers. Between the two suppliers, 
we assume that one provides intermediate products for the EFPs and another for the EUFPs. Considering 
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that the EFPs gradually replace the EUFPs, the business strategies for the two suppliers can be totally 
different. The supplier providing the EFPs’ intermediate products will more likely win its business 
contracts from the manufacturer. While the other supplier will more likely lose its business as the 
manufacturer replaces the EUFPs by the EFPs. However, in reality, the supplier would seek for gaining the 
EFP’s business rather than to be the loser by only providing the EUFPs’ intermediate products. Therefore, 
an alternative case can be that two suppliers provide intermediate products for both the EFPs and EUFPs. 
In this case, the suppliers’ strategic positions will depend on the types of intermediate products (e.g. similar 
or different) and the levels of quality and price they can provide to win the contracts from the manufacturer. 
Therefore, the two suppliers are more likely to be involved in competition with market demand 
uncertainties. However, this case with multiple competitive suppliers is not the focal point for this current 
study, but an interesting direction for future research. 
Costs structure and transfer prices with multiple suppliers  
In order to avoid complexity with competition issue, we will focus on the case including multiple 
suppliers who provide different intermediate products for both the EFPs and EUFPs. Therefore, there will 
be no competition between the suppliers due to providing different products.  The suppliers would win their 
business based on their production strategy and position, assuming the suppliers run their operations 
independently within the supply chain. The manufacturer can deal the multiple suppliers as individuals 
within a single group. Based on the assumptions, the two-echelon supply chain model with multiple 
suppliers can be formulated in the similar way to the above modeling, but with different price and cost 
items associated with to the different suppliers. Let i be the number of the suppliers (i=1,2…,l), one unit of 
the finished goods consumes νi units of ith intermediate products. Since the suppliers are treated as similar 
individuals within a single group in our model, thus, in the model formulae of the above sections, each of 
the items associated with single supplier is replaced by accumulated term 
l
i si1
(.) for including multiple 
suppliers. Eqs. (7.1)-(7.4) will be rewritten by replacing the items of the supplier with the accumulated 
terms, together with renumbering Eqs. (7.5)-7.6), we obtain the following: 
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The same way applies to other relevant formulae in the above sections. The multiple suppliers are 
interrelated for determining the transfer prices, at which the manufacturer shares the government subsidies 
with the suppliers. Due to that fact that the multiple suppliers provide different intermediate products with 
no competition, the government subsidies can therefore be distributed from the manufacturer and shared 
among the suppliers in a similar way, for example,  with the same proportion to their individual average 
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incremental costs for producing the EFP’s intermediate products (Ding et al. 2015).  Thus, Eq.(3) can be 
rewritten as follows:  
]) [()( 11t


nt e
tisi
u
si
e
sii
u
si
e
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where i is the distribution coefficient of the government subsidies for supplier i,  it is measured by the 
ratio of the incremental cost of individual supplier i to the total incremental costs of the all suppliers for 
producing the EFP’s intermediate product.  
Numerical illustration 
Considering the case with two suppliers for i=1, 2, the data for manufacturer and supplier 1 was 
maintained as the same as in Table 2, while the data for supplier 2 was estimated relative to supplier 1 (see 
Table 10).  
Table 10   Suppliers’ investment costs and operating parameters 
Pollution prevention initial investment cost items Thousand 
Supplier’s investment Isi (i=1) 3,000,000 
(i=2) 1,000,000 
Operating data items 
Item 
(i=1) 
Thousand 
/Unit 
Item  
(i=2) 
Thousand 
/Unit 
Item 
(i=1) 
Thousand 
/Unit 
Item 
(i=2) 
Thousand 
/Unit 
u
sP  30 
u
sP  15 
u
sF  5 
u
sF  2.5 
e
sC  15 
e
sC  7.5 
u
sH  2.5 
u
sH  1.25 
u
sC  10 
u
sC  5 
e
sE  0.01/unit 
e
sE  0.005/unit 
u
sW  3 
u
sW  1.5 
u
sE  0.03/unit 
u
sE  0.015/unit 
e
sW  2 
e
sW  1 ν 2 ν 2 
u
s  
1.63 u
s  
0.82 
sV  
1.63 
sV  
0.82 
1.80 0.90 1.75 0.88 
 0.99 
 
0.49  0.99 
 
0.49 
 
The results with two suppliers are presented in Tables 11-14 for the four scenarios described above, 
respectively. By assuming no competition between the suppliers, the results show the similar pattern to the 
case with one supplier, except that the government subsidies shared from the manufacturer need to be 
distributed between the suppliers, with individual shared portion via the transfer prices. The transfer price 
determination is based on the ratio of the incremental costs of each individual supplier to the total 
incremental costs of the all suppliers for producing the EFP’s intermediate product. The transfer prices 
need to be satisfied by the supply chain firms. Moreover, adding more suppliers without increasing 
environmental carrying capacity for pollution emission that allocated to supply chain system, the initial 
sales quantities of the EFPs tend to become larger with the EUFPs even more quickly replaced. The 
rationale is when the total amount of allowed emissions allocated to a supply chain system is strict, more 
suppliers mean potentially more total emissions in the supply chain so that, more EFPs need to be produced 
to replace the EUFPs for complying with regulation standard.  
Table 11  Numerical results of optimal solutions with two suppliers (Scenario 1, n1 = 4 years) 
)(*1 
e
sP =32.81 thousand, )(
*
2 
e
sP =15.77 thousand, *=0.515, 0.390.61 21   ， ，1=0.314，2=0.201 
*** e
H1
e
E1
e
1 QQQ   ( mV =2.6, s1V =1.75, s2V =0.88;
u
m =2.7, 
u
s1 =1.8, 
u
s2 =0.9) 
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=9 t=10 
*e
tQ  84444  91200  98496  106376  114886  124077  134003  140000  140000  140000  
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*e
mtP  
(thousand) 
150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
*
ta   0.082   0.072   0.062   0.053  0  0 0 0 0 0 
mtB  
(thousand) 
 3.105   2.710   2.345   2.006  0 0 0 0 0 0 
scNPV  
(million) 
 -5,527.70   -3,130.10   -803.15  1,456.91   3,532.76   5,570.86   7,571.91   9,472.47  11,200.24   12,770.94  
mNPV  
(million) 
 -2,721.75   -1,496.50   -320.57   809.39   1,775.69   2,724.42   3,655.90   4,540.60   5,344.87   6,076.02  
1sNPV  
(million) 
 -2,138.57   -1,292.81   -462.42   352.87   1,153.33   1,939.24   2,710.87   3,443.74   4,109.98   4,715.66  
2sNPV  
(million) 
 -667.38   -340.80   -20.16   294.65   603.73   907.20   1,205.15   1,488.13   1,745.39   1,979.26  
 
Table 12  Numerical results of optimal solutions with two suppliers (Scenario 2, n1 = 4 years) 
)(*1 
e
sP =32.88 thousand, )(
*
2 
e
sP =15.78 thousand, *=0.527, 0.390.61 21   ， ，1=0.321，2=0.206 
*** e
H1
e
E1
e
1 QQQ   ( mV =2.43, s1V =1.63, s2V =0.82;
u
m =2.43, 
u
s1 =1.63, 
u
s2 =0.82) 
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=9 t=10 
*e
tQ  84444  91200  98496  106376  114886  124077  134003  140000  140000  140000  
*e
mtP  
(thousand) 
150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
*
ta   0.083   0.072   0.063   0.054  0  0 0 0 0 0 
mtB  
(thousand) 
 3.129   2.734   2.369   2.030  0 0 0 0 0 0 
scNPV  
(million) 
 -5,584.97   -3,243.60   -971.85  1,234.01   3,254.93   5,239.10   7,187.21   9,037.47  10,719.52   12,248.66  
mNPV  
(million) 
 -2,753.57   -1,559.55   -414.29   685.56   1,620.58   2,538.60   3,439.93   4,295.99   5,074.23   5,781.72  
1sNPV  
(million) 
 -2,154.51   -1,324.40   -509.38   290.82   1,076.48   1,847.84   2,605.19   3,324.50   3,978.41   4,572.88  
2sNPV  
(million) 
 -676.89   -359.65   -48.18   257.62   557.87   852.66   1,142.09   1,416.98   1,666.88   1,894.06  
 
Table 13  Numerical results of optimal solutions with two suppliers (Scenario 3, n1 = 4 years) 
)(*1 
e
sP =33.13 thousand, )(
*
2 
e
sP =15.85 thousand, *=0.575, 0.390.61 21   ， ，1=0.351，2=0.224 
*
1
*
1
*
1
e
E
e
H
e QQQ   ( mV =1.49, s1V =0.99, s2V =0.49;
u
m =1.49 , 
u
s1 =0.99, 
u
s2 =0.49) 
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=9 t=10 
*e
tQ  84622 91392 98703 106600 115128 124338 134285 140000 140000 140000 
*e
mtP  
(thousand) 
150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
*
ta  0.081 0.071 0.061 0.053 0 0 0 0 0 0 
mtB  
(thousand) 
3.118  2.724  2.359  2.021  0 0 0 0 0 0 
scNPV  
(million) 
 -5,802.30   -3,674.32   -1,612.07   388.10   2,207.40   3,993.61   5,747.36   7,409.52  8,920.58   10,294.27  
mNPV  
(million) 
 -2,874.31   -1,798.84   -769.97   215.61   1,038.77   1,846.95   2,640.45   3,392.51  4,076.20   4,697.74  
1sNPV   -2,211.81   -1,437.94   -678.15   67.83   800.24   1,519.34   2,225.36   2,894.52  3,502.84   4,055.87  
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(million) 
2sNPV  
(million) 
 -716.19   -437.54   -163.95   104.66   368.39   627.32   881.55   1,122.50  1,341.54   1,540.67  
 
Table 14  Numerical results of optimal solutions excluding public health factors with two suppliers 
(Scenario 4, n1 = 5 years) 
)(*1 
e
sP =33.36 thousand, )(
*
2 
e
sP =15.94 thousand, *=0.687, 0.390.61 21   ， , 1=0.419, 2=0.268,
*
1
*
1
e
H
e QQ   
 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=9 t=10 
*e
tQ   84,444   91,200   98,496  106,376   114,886   124,077   134,003   140,000   140,000   140,000  
*e
mtP  
(thousand) 
150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
*
ta   0.085   0.075   0.065   0.055   0.047  0 0 0 0 0 
mtB  
(thousand) 
 3.129   2.734   2.369   2.030   1.717  0 0 0 0 0 
scNPV  
(million) 
 -6,147.68   -4,358.78   -2,629.46   -956.18   664.34   2,135.14   3,579.19   4,950.72  6,197.57   7,331.07  
mNPV  
(million) 
 -3,038.54   -2,124.31   -1,253.76   -423.62   369.08   1,027.11   1,673.17   2,286.79  2,844.63   3,351.75  
1sNPV  
(million) 
 -2,330.19   -1,672.56   -1,026.89   -392.95   229.46   840.55   1,440.53   2,010.38  2,528.42   2,999.37  
2sNPV  
(million) 
 -778.95   -561.91   -348.82   -139.61   65.81   267.48   465.49   653.56   824.53   979.95  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
The supply chain management practice towards eco-sustainability in terms of reducing environmental 
and social externalities is more often complex in reality and expects long run tasks. One of the crucial 
issues in supply chain management is the trade-off between economic objective and environmental 
sustainability and social responsibility. By taking perspectives from supply chain firms and stakeholders 
including governments, communities, and consumers, this study constructs a sustainable supply chain 
framework with multiple sustainable constraints in view of the triple bottom line dimensions to evaluate the 
economic, environmental, and social performances of a supply chain. In addition, the case for the 
sustainable supply chain with multiple supplies assuming no competitions between suppliers has been also 
addressed. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways: (1) we have explored the mechanism that 
motivates supply chain firms to collaboratively reduce the impacts of pollutant emissions on environment 
and public health by producing EFPs through environmental technology investments under sustainable 
constraints with triple bottom line dimensions representing stakeholder’s sustainable interests; (2) we have 
examined the impacts of interplay and interrelation of the multiple sustainable constraints representing 
environmental and social interests on the supply chain transfer price and profit allotment decisions when 
taking government intervention into consideration; (3) we have extended the research by incorporating 
public health factor into our model from social dimension to analyze the joint effects of multiple factors on 
supply chain firms’ performance from triple bottom line dimensions; (4) we have addressed the multiple 
suppliers case assuming no competitions between them.  
Our findings suggest that supply chain firms’ environmental decisions interplay with the trade-offs 
between financial feasibility of their green investments and stakeholders’ interests of environmental and 
public health represented by the sustainable constraints. Through the government subsidy sharing 
negotiations between the supply chain members, the transfer price is collaboratively determined, which is 
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crucial to sustain the supply chain. Distinct from the previous studies that consider only economic and 
environmental aspects (two dimensions), in view of triple bottom line the inclusion of the third dimension 
of social aspect (public healthcare cost) generates the double effects, the implication is that the optimal 
decision policy for operating the EFPs is not only affected by the environmental constraint but also the 
public health constraint. As for supply chain operations, to motivate supply chain firms to invest in EFPs, 
collaboratively realizing break-even in a finite time period through supply chain profit allotment that is 
interrelated with sharing of government incentive policy forms the backbone of supply chain sustainability.  
Based on our findings, we can draw the following conclusions. First, the profit allotment is determined 
through the negotiation of the transfer price interrelated with the government subsidy sharing between the 
supply chain members. Second, consumers’ environmental awareness that represents the market constraint 
depends on their living standards. It is also affected by the government incentive policy, which has a 
stronger impact on EFPs’ market diffusion process and manufacturer’s price decisions. Third, the EFPs’ 
optimal operational decisions are jointly affected by multiple factors such as the environmental standards, 
the level of public healthcare cost for loss of human health caused by pollution, and the level of supply 
chain firms’ pollutant emissions. The government policies, together with the support of consumers’ 
environmental awareness, play the key role to help the supply chain firms gain the EFPs’ market position 
by overcome the cost disadvantage and ultimately become self-sustaining. Fourth, in the case when the 
suppliers provide different intermediate products respectively without competition between them, they can 
be treated as a single group to negotiate the transfer price in terms of sharing the government subsidy with 
the manufacturer. The shared portion of the government subsidy to the supply chain group is distributed 
between the suppliers based on the ratios of the incremental cost of individual supplier to the total 
incremental costs of the all suppliers for producing the EFP’s intermediate product. 
There are issues that need to be explored in future studies. For instance, the research would conduct the 
question of how supply chain firms can be effectively driven or motivated to collaboratively initiate their 
environmental technology innovation for pollution prevention in the competitive market. Another avenue 
for future research could be extending the model into a supply chain with multiple suppliers involving 
supply competitions.  
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